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Abstract
This article seeks to provide a response to the Aloneness Argument Against Clas-
sical Theism proposed by Joseph C. Schmid and Ryan T. Mullins. This response 
focuses on showing the unsoundness of the argument once the Doctrine of Divine 
Simplicity is reformulated within the essentialist aspectival framework provided 
by the Aspectival Account. Formulating a response to this argument will thus also 
serve the further purpose of providing an extension of the Aspectival Account and a 
needed revision of the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity, which can aid others in their 
quest to further clarify the nature of this doctrine.
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Introduction
In recent analytic philosophy of religion, certain philosophers have sought to raise 
issues concerning the veracity of Classical Theism—a specific theological trajectory 
that maintains a strong distinction between God and creation, and includes within 
it such luminaries as Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas—by proposing various argu-
ments that aim to show the falsity of a specific doctrine: the Doctrine of Divine Sim-
plicity, which underpins the concept of God within this particular trajectory. One 
important argument: the ‘Aloneness Argument Against Classical Theism’ (hereafter, 
Aloneness Argument), has recently been formulated by Joseph C. Schmid and Ryan 
T. Mullins (2021) in order to demonstrate the falsity of the Doctrine of Divine Sim-
plicity by deducing an internal conflict between it and two other attributes of God 
that are affirmed by Classical Theism: Divine Creative Freedom and Divine Omnis-
cience. It will be helpful to now unpack their argument and then proceed in the next 
few sections to formulate a response to it.
The Doctrine of Divine Simplicity (hereafter, DDS), as noted by Schmid and 
Mullins (2021, 2), is best construed as such:
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(1) (Divine Simplicity) There is no metaphysical or physical composition in God, such that:
(i) There is no distinction in God between substance/attribute, 
essence/existence, form/matter, act/potency, genus/ differentia, 
agent/action, and essence/accident
(ii) All of God’s intrinsic features are identical not only to each 
other but to God Himself
The central claim made by the DDS is the denial of any form of metaphysical 
complexity in God. More specifically, it is the denial of the obtaining of a state of 
affairs in which God possesses a numerically distinct intrinsic feature. In further 
understanding the nature of this denial, it will be helpful to now follow Schmid and 
Mullins (2021, 2) in defining the notion of an intrinsic feature as follows: a feature 
of an entity is a ‘positive ontological item’ of that entity; thus, an intrinsic feature 
is a feature that characterises an entity solely in virtue of that entity. In contrast, an 
extrinsic feature is one that characterises an entity in virtue of it standing in a rela-
tionship with another entity. According to Schmid and Mullins (2021, 2), intrinsic 
features are either essential (i.e. features that must be had by an entity), or acciden-
tal (i.e. features that can be had or lacked by an entity).1
Classical Theists explicitly deny the possession of any accidental intrinsic fea-
tures by God, primarily due to the fact, as noted by Schmid and Mullins (2021, 5), 
that an accidental feature is a contingent feature of an entity. And thus, as the DDS 
requires one to assert the fact of anything intrinsic to God being identical to him, 
then it would result in God being identical to something contingent, which Schmid 
and Mullins (2021, 5) say is ‘absurd’. However, this absurdity seems to be the con-
clusion that the Classical Theist must reach if she is to continue to affirm the DDS. 
That is, the Aloneness Argument seeks to highlight the dilemma that the Classical 
Theist faces in affirming the veracity of the DDS, and thus, following Schmid and 
Mullins (2021, 3–6), we can express this argument informally as follows: various 
theologians and philosophers working within the Classical Theistic trajectory held 
to the ‘aloneness of God’. The aloneness of God is the fact of it being possible that 
God exists in a ‘non-God’ world—a world in which there are no other entities with 
positive ‘ontological status’. However, according to the Doctrine of Divine Creative 
Freedom (a doctrine, as noted by Schmid and Mullins (2021, 2) that was widely 
affirmed within Classical Theism), God is free to create or not create a non-God 
world, which entails the fact of the creation of the non-God world being a contingent 
state of affairs—in other words, there is a possible world in which God exists alone, 
and there are possible worlds in which God exists with non-God things. Thus, given 
the contingency of creation, any possible world that one picks out would include a 
contingent truth concerning whether or not God created a non-God world. Moreo-
ver, in the worlds in which God exists alone, there will be contingent truths concern-
ing whether God exists alone and contingent truths concerning God’s free choice to 
refrain from creating. Hence, according to Schmid and Mullins (2021, 6), in each 
1 The nature of the essence/accident distinction assumed in this article will be further elucidated below.
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possible world—which would include the actual world— there will be a certain con-
tingent truth concerning God’s creative act, or lack thereof.
Now, given the Doctrine of Divine Omniscience (another important doctrinal 
commitment made by Classical Theists), God is an entity that knows everything that 
exists, obtains and is true. Thus, as there are contingent truths in every world, it 
follows from this that, first, God contingently has some knowledge in every world, 
and, second, this contingent knowledge is either wholly intrinsic, wholly extrinsic, or 
partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic to God. However, as Schmid and Mullins note 
(2021, 5–6), in the alone worlds, God would not have this contingent knowledge 
extrinsically, or partly intrinsically and partly extrinsically, as both of these man-
ners of knowing would require that God stands in some relation to another distinct 
entity. Yet, in the alone worlds, there would not be any other entities apart from God 
to fulfil this role. Hence, God’s contingent knowledge must be wholly intrinsic—
God has this knowledge solely in virtue of himself. Now, this contingent knowledge 
that is wholly intrinsic to God is either an essential feature of him or an accidental 
feature. However, it is quite clear that this feature cannot be an essential feature of 
him, as this would render him as a contingent. Thus, God must have this contingent 
knowledge accidentally, which entails the fact of it being possible for God to have an 
accident. Yet, as noted above, if the DDS is, in fact, true, then it is not possible for 
God to have accidents. Hence, the DDS must thus be false. This informal presenta-
tion of the Aloneness Argument can be stated more precisely through the following 
argument scheme provided by Schmid and Mullins (2021, 6):
(2) (Aloneness Argument) (A1) God’s knowledge is either wholly intrinsic to God, wholly extrinsic to 
God, or intrinsic to God in some respects but extrinsic to God in others
(A2) God’s knowledge is (i) wholly extrinsic to God or (ii) intrinsic to God 
in some respects but extrinsic to God in others only if God doesn’t exist 
alone
(A3) Possibly, God exists alone
(A4) So, possibly, God’s knowledge is wholly intrinsic. (A1– A3)
(A5). Necessarily, God contingently has some knowledge
(A6) So, possibly, God contingently has wholly intrinsic knowledge. (A4, 
A5)
(A7) Whatever is wholly intrinsic to S is either an essential feature of S or 
an accident of S
(A8) Nothing God contingently has can be an essential feature of God
(A9) So, possibly, God has an accident. (A6–A8)
(A10) If DDS is true, it is not possible that God has an accident
(A11) So, DDS is false. (A9, A10)
The conclusion reached by the Aloneness Argument—namely, the falsity of the 
DDS—results in the veracity of the Classical Theistic framework (which assumes 
this as an integral doctrine of its framework) being called into question. So, the cen-
tral question that the Classical Theist must now face is: is the Aloneness Argument 
indeed a sound argument and thus, for rationality’s sake, one should renounce their 
allegiance to Classical Theism? Now, though I am a proponent of Classical Theism, 
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I believe that the Aloneness Argument is indeed sound, and thus gives anyone 
attracted to the DDS motivation to revise her view—in other words, it is a success-
ful argument against a particular conception of the DDS, resulting in the Classical 
Theist not being able to consistently maintain this conception in light of the issues 
raised. So I do believe with Schmid and Mullins (2021, 16) that the Aloneness Argu-
ment does ‘serve as a tool for fresh enquiry about the nature of God and His relation 
to the created world’. Yet, despite this concession and agreement, it does not mean, 
as Schmid and Mullins surely believe, that this ‘fresh look’ should also result in a 
loosening of one’s grip on a strong version of the DDS (through, for example, adopt-
ing a weak/non-identity version of the doctrine). As one can indeed affirm a strong 
version of the DDS without, however, also affirming the classical conception of this 
doctrine. More specifically, the central focus of this article will be to explicate an 
account of the DDS that is not plagued by the issues raised by this argument. Yet, 
to re-iterate the above point, this particular account of the doctrine is not the classi-
cal conception of DDS that is expressed through (1)—as it will make some moves, 
namely the acceptance of accidents in the divine life, that are ruled out by this state-
ment of the doctrine. Nevertheless, this account is one that still upholds a strong ver-
sion of the DDS, such that it does not deny the numerical identity of God with his 
attributes, and each of his attributes with one another—in short, a proponent of this 
account can indeed affirm the statement that ‘there is nothing that is in God, that is 
not God’ (Dolezal, 2011, xvi). Thus, the proposed account will indeed be one that a 
Classical Theist would want to adopt in order to avoid the conclusion of the Alone-
ness Argument. Since by one employing (a further refined version of) the Aspectival 
Account of Divine Simplicity (hereafter, Aspectival Account),2 one has good reason 
to doubt (A10) of the Aloneness Argument—namely, the assumption that God can-
not have any accidents whatsoever. That is, in other words, this assumption—which 
we can term the ‘Accidents Assumption’—can be challenged by one adopting the 
Aspectival Account, which will allow a Classical Theist to posit the fact of God 
bearing accidents (i.e. ‘accidental aspects’), yet remaining simple and necessary—
thus the Accidents Assumption (A10), and the Aloneness Argument that is built on 
this assumption, being false. Hence, the focus of this article is not to defend the 
classical conception of the DDS against the Aloneness Argument. Rather, it is to 
show that the Aloneness Argument is not successful against the strong, yet revised, 
version of the DDS that is proposed by the Aspectival Account. To put it differently, 
the focus of this article is to demonstrate the veracity of the following conditional 
statement: if the Aloneness Argument is successful against the classical conception 
of the DDS (i.e. (1)), then a Classical Theist should adopt the Aspectival Account 
in order to ward off this argument and the final conclusion that is entailed by it—
namely, the falsity of Classical Theism. The Aloneness Argument is thus assumed to 
be a successful argument against the classical conception of the DDS, but, as it will 
2 The Aspectival Account was introduced into the literature by (Sijuwade, 2021), who focused in that 
article on answering Alvin Plantinga’s objections to the cogency of the DDS. This article thus serves as 
a further extension of this account through the utilisation of the notion of ‘essentialism’ and the applica-
tion of this account to another important objection raised against the DDS.
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be shown subsequently, it is not a successful argument against the strong version of 
this doctrine—which is all that is necessary for one to affirm in order to be an adher-
ent of Classical Theism.3
Thus, the plan is as follows: in section two (‘The Nature of Aspects’), I provide 
an explication of the notion of an aspect provided by Donald Baxter. Then, in sec-
tion three (‘The Nature of Essentialism’), I provide an explication of the notion of 
essentialism provided by Kit Fine. After this, in section four (‘Aspectival Simplic-
ity’), I focus on applying these two notions to the DDS to show the falsity of the 
Accidents Assumption, and thus premise (A10) of the Aloneness Argument, which 
will allow us to affirm the unsoundness of the argument (and provide a means for us 
to further precisify the DDS). After this section, there will be a final section (Con-
clusion) summarising the above results and concluding the article.
The nature of aspects
Donald L.M. Baxter (1999, 2016, 2018a, 2018b) introduced the concept of an 
‘aspect’ into the contemporary metaphysical literature in order to provide a coher-
ent conceptual foundation for the notion of qualitative self-differing (hereafter, 
self-differing). Self-differing is the qualitative differing of some entity in one way 
(or respect) from itself in another (Baxter, 1999). To help motivate the existence of 
aspects within this context, we can consider a case in which an individual is torn 
about what to do (or how to feel) in a certain situation:
David is an ardent philosophy professor and is also a loving and faithful father 
of two children, Jacob and Melissa. Now suppose that, firstly, David has an 
upcoming philosophy conference in which he is the keynote speaker and, due 
to other work commitments, has not prepared his speech yet. Secondly, sup-
pose that David had previously promised that he would reward his children 
with a camping trip this upcoming weekend if they achieved A* grades in their 
3 It is important to note that there is a diversity of positions that fall under the category of Classical The-
ism, as Veli Matti Kärkkäinen (2017, 35) writes that there is a ‘diversity and plurality of interpretations 
of God under the umbrella concept of classical theism’. And John W. Cooper (2006, 322), in voicing a 
similar point writes, ‘traditional classical theism is not a single, monolithic position. It has variations and 
nuances on many issues’. Nevertheless, there is a distinguishing factor between Classical Theism and 
other models of God, which centres on our understanding of the ‘strength’ or ‘strictness’ of the divine 
attributes, as John C. Peckham (2019, 9–10, emphasis in text) helpfully notes,
 Some believe the label classical theism should be reserved for views that affirm a strict conception of 
the classical divine attributes…A strict classical theist…is one who subscribes to a strong or strict under-
standing of the divine attributes. Accordingly, the strict classical theist is one who affirms, as a tightly 
connected package, divine perfection, necessity, pure aseity, utter self-sufficiency, strict simplicity…The 
italicized modifiers in the previous sentence denote some ways in which strict classical theism affirms 
these attributes in a strong or strict sense.
 This is a vital point. As the adherent of Classical Theism is only required to uphold a strong or strict 
understanding of the DDS (and the other divine attributes)—rather, than upholding one that has prece-
dent in the classical tradition (such as that expressed in (1))—in order for them to fall under the umbrella 
of Classical Theism. One can thus reject the classical conception of DDS, yet affirm a strong (and 
revised) version of it, and thus still be classed as a Classical Theist.
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A-Level results. And, thirdly, suppose that Jacob and Mellissa have both, in 
fact, recently achieved A* grades in their A-Level results.4
In this specific scenario, David is in a situation of self-differing as he knows that 
he has an important keynote speech that he needs to prepare. David being an ardent 
philosophy professor results in him wanting to fulfil this commitment and thus com-
plete his speech. So, the following proposition would be true: David ‘does not want 
to take his children on a camping trip this upcoming weekend’. However, having 
promised his children that he would reward them for their academic achievement, 
and being a loving and faithful father, he wants to fulfil his promise to them. So, the 
following conflicting proposition would also be true: David ‘wants to take his chil-
dren on a camping trip this weekend’. David is torn. He is in conflict with himself. 
He thus differs from himself. David’s struggle is between two aspects of him: David 
insofar as he is a philosopher versus David insofar as he is a father. This, and other 
cases of internal conflict, are cases of self-differing, where the subjects of what dif-
fers are the aspects of the individual that self-differs. Thus, for the case to be one of 
differing, one aspect must possess a quality that another aspect lacks. And for it to 
be a case of self-differing, the aspects must be numerically identical with the indi-
vidual that bears them (Baxter, 2018a, 907). Off of this introduction to the notion of 
an aspect, we can further elucidate this notion at two levels: the semantic level and 
the ontological level.
At the semantic level, the aspects in these cases of self-differing, as seen above, 
are expressed through ‘nominal qualifiers’ such as ‘insofar as’ (or ‘in some respect’ 
and to a lesser extent ‘as’ and ‘qua’)—which serve a special role of referring to 
aspects, as they are specifically present within self-differing cases, where the same 
entity can be discernible from itself. Furthermore, following Jason Turner (2014, 
227), the use of a nominal qualifier in these cases (and other cases like them) can be 
further precisified via formalisation where one takes ‘a’ as a regular term and ‘φ(y)’ 
as any formula open in y, which allows us to introduce a term to refer to aspects 
(i.e. an aspect term) written as such: ‘ay[φ(y)]’. From this semantic basis, we can 
now progress onto the ontological level, which will allow us to further elucidate the 
nature of an aspect.
At the ontological level, according to Baxter (2018a, 914), aspects are difficult to 
distinguish from other entities.5 However, we can begin to acquire an understand-
ing of their nature by describing their functional role and the relationship to the 
5 As Baxter (2018a, 914) writes, ‘aspects should not be confused with Casteneda’s guises, or Fine’s qua-
objects, or other such attenuated entities’.
4 This example is based on a similar example provided by Baxter (2018a, 901–902). In motivating 
aspects, Baxter believes that the clearest cases, as in the example in the main text, are those of the inter-
nal psychological conflict of a person. However, self-differing, according to Baxter, is not only confined 
to these psychological conflicts but, as Baxter writes, cases ‘of being torn give us the experiences by 
which we know that there are numerically identical, qualitatively differing aspects. We feel them’, (Bax-
ter, 2018b, 104). Thus, at a general level, as we will see, self-differing is present in any case where an 
entity has a property and lacks it at the same time, in the virtue of playing different roles.
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individuals that bear them.6 Primarily, the aspects of an individual function as the 
particular ways of being of that individual—a particular way or manner in which 
that individual exists. However, as ways of being of an individual, aspects are not 
qualities (or properties) as they, themselves, possess qualities (or properties) due to 
their numerical identity to the individuals that bear them.7 Aspects, however, do not 
possess all of the qualities that the particular individuals that they are aspects have. 
Moreover, in a similar manner to their bearers, they are particular entities—rather 
than universals—through Leibniz’s Law failing to hold for them.8 Secondly, despite 
the numerical identity between individuals and their aspects, aspects are not ‘com-
plete individuals’, due to the fact that complete individuals are entities that can exist 
independently. Instead, according to Baxter (2018a, 916), aspects are ‘incomplete 
entities’ due to them ‘having fewer properties than it takes to exist on one’s own’. 
Aspects are thus incomplete in the sense of them being dependent upon the com-
plete individuals that they are numerically identical to. The nature of a complete 
individual determines the aspects that they have, in that they depend entirely upon 
how that individual entity is—once we have the individual, we also have its ways of 
being (Giannotti, 2019, 2). Thirdly, aspects are not mereological parts of the indi-
viduals that they are aspects of, as, again, they are numerically identical to, rather 
than a ‘part’ of, these individuals (Baxter, 1999, 2). Lastly, aspects are not mental 
abstractions. That is, even though a complete individual’s aspects are abstract enti-
ties (through them failing to exhaust the content or plime that they are aspects of), 
that can be considered by means of abstraction—where one abstracts a way that an 
individual is— it is important to note, as Baxter (2016, 104) writes, that the dif-
ference between a complete individual and their aspects is ‘a less-than-numerical 
distinction but more than a mere distinction of reason’. Baxter terms this distinc-
tion an aspectival distinction, which results in the aspects of an individual only ever 
being two (or more) in a ‘loose’ sense when they are counted based on qualitative 
distinction. However, in a ‘strict’ sense, when the aspects are counted based on a 
numerical distinction, they are only ever one. Thus, aspects, as Baxter notes, provide 
a ‘complexity to the simple, i.e., a qualitative complexity to the quantitatively sim-
ple’ (Baxter, 2016, 178).
Taking this explanation of the semantic and ontological features of aspects into 
account, for further clarity, we can construe the concept of an aspect more precisely 
as follows:
6 This functional role fulfilled by an aspect is similar to that of ‘mode’, which has recently been re-intro-
ducedinto the literature Jonathan Lowe (2006, 23–24), and John Heil (2012, 3–4). However, the central 
differencebetween an aspect and a mode is that the former, and not the latter, is numerically identical 
with the individualthat bears it.
7 In reference to aspects, there will be an interchanging of the term ‘qualities’ with the term ‘properties’. 
However, the former term is preferable over the latter term, as it helps us to ward of mistaking the enti-
ties that are born by aspects to be further entities that are ontologically different from them.
8 More on this below.
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(3) (Aspect) (a) An aspect is a qualitatively differing, incomplete abstract particular entity that is 
numerically identical to the complete individual that bears it (and any other aspect pos-
sessed by that individual)
(b) It functions as a particular way that a complete individual is and is determined by that 
individual’s nature
(c) It is expressed through a nominal qualifier such as ‘insofar as’, which, at a precise 
level, can be captured through the use of an aspect term (such as ay[φ(y)])
(d) It is distinguishable through an aspectival distinction, rather than a numerical or 
conceptual distinction
 From this basic construal of an aspect, we can now return to our example of self-
differing and re-construe the notion of self-differing to be that of the qualitative dif-
fering of numerically identical aspects possessed by an individual (Baxter, 2018b, 
92). So, for example, ‘David insofar as he is a philosopher’ refers to one, numeri-
cally identical aspect of David and ‘David insofar as he is a father’ refers to another, 
numerically identical aspect of him. Aspects can thus differ in their qualities without 
the resultant differences indicating numerically distinct individuals (Baxter, 2016, 
175). More fully, we can apply some aspect terms to our self-differing example, 
where one aspect term of David would be:  Davidy[y is a father], which is a name 
for ‘David insofar as he is a father’. And another aspect term of David would be 
 Davidy[y is a philosopher] which is a name for ‘David insofar he is a philosopher’. 
Thus, re-construing the above situation as such:
(4) Davidy[y is a philosopher] does not want to take his children on a camping trip this weekend
 and
(5) ∼Davidy[y is a father] does not want to take his children on a camping trip this weekend
 It would seem as if one is affirming a contradiction. However, through the use 
of nominal qualifiers such as ‘insofar as’ (i.e. formally ay[φ(y)]), it removes any 
explicit contradiction, as the above case does not say that it is David, unqualified, 
that does and does not want to take his children on a camping trip this weekend. 
Nor does it say that David, in one ‘part’, does not want to take his children on a 
camping trip this weekend. Either of those, as Baxter (2018b, 908) notes, would 
indeed be contradictory. Rather it is simply  Davidy[y is a father] (i.e. David insofar 
as he is a father) who wants to take his children on a camping trip this weekend, 
and  Davidy[y is a philosopher] (i.e. David insofar he is a philosopher) who does not 
want to take his children on a camping trip this weekend. So, at a ‘coarse-grained’ 
level, in our example, we have David being in a self-differing situation in which he 
has two aspects that qualitatively differ:  Davidy[y is philosopher] and  Davidy[y is a 
father]. However, at a more ‘fine-grained’ level, what we do in fact have is a qualita-
tive difference between the sub-aspects of David, where a sub-aspect of an entity 
can be construed formally as follows:
1 3
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(6) (Sub-Aspect) (∃x)(∃z)(xy[φ(y)]zy[φ(y)])
Informally: Some z is an aspect of an aspect x
 Specifically, the conflict that we have in this case is not so much between  Davidy[y 
is a philosopher] and  Davidy[y is a father], but the sub-aspects of these aspects: 
David insofar as he is a philosopher (aspect) insofar as he is the keynote speaker 
(sub-aspect)—which can be written as the aspect term:  Davidy[y is a keynote]. And 
David insofar as he is a father (aspect) insofar as he made a promise (sub-aspect)—
which can be written as the aspect term:  Davidy[y is promiser]. It is these entities 
that qualitatively differ, and not the aspects of Davis per se, as it is specifically David 
in fulfilment of his role as a philosopher who fulfils the role of the ‘keynote’ and 
thus, given the latter role, he does not want to take his children on the camping trip. 
And it is David in fulfilment of his role as a father who fulfils the role of ‘promiser’ 
(to his children), and thus, given the fulfilment of this role, he does want to take his 
children on the camping trip. Sub-aspects, and not just the aspects of the individual 
under question, thus play an important role in this case and others. For reasons of 
brevity, however, we will continue at a more ‘coarse grained’ level to refer to the 
aspects (and not the sub-aspects) of David as playing a role in this self-differing 
case—with the notion of a sub-aspect being re-introduced in the next section. Thus, 
what we have with the aspects (and the sub-aspects) of an individual is that of the 
negation, as Baxter (2016, 104) writes, being internal ‘that is, has short-scope rela-
tive to the nominal qualifier and so there is no contradiction’. Thus, it is the aspects 
of David that has the conflicting qualities noted above, but not David (unqualified). 
That is, one can block the secundum quid ad simpliciter inference, which, following 
Baxter (2018a, 913), can be written formally as such:
(7) (Block) ∼(∀x)(F(xy[φ(y)]) → Fx)
Informally:  It doesn’t follow from the fact that an aspect of a complete individual x is F that x is F
 So, according to Baxter (2018a, 913), by the above being true, an individual inso-
far as they are a particular way bearing a particular quality does not entail that the 
individual unqualified bears that same quality. Thus, in our case, supposing David 
insofar as he is a philosopher does not want to go on a camping trip, it also does 
not follow that David does not want to go on a camping trip— as David might in 
fact mostly want to go on the camping trip rather than not, so that ‘David does want 
to go on a camping trip’ is what is overall true. Yet,  Davidy[y is a philosopher] and 
 Davidy[y is a father]—as aspects of David—are identical to him. Thus, as Baxter 
(2018a, 911) notes, the following principle holds within an aspectival context:
(8) (Aspect Identity) (∀x)(x = xy[φ(y)] → (∃z)(xy[φ(y)] = z))
Informally: Every aspect is numerically identical with a complete individual x
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 In reality, David is  Davidy[y is a philosopher], and David is  Davidy[y is a father]—
David insofar as he is a particular way (i.e. as philosopher or father) is still David.9 
Moreover, taking into account the characteristics of the numerical identity rela-
tion—specifically the transitivity of identity—will result in:
(9) Davidy[y is a philosopher] =  Davidy[y is a father]
 which is that of David’s aspects each being numerically identical to one another. 
Thus, in this context, the same thing can be abstractedly considered in two ways, and 
in this discernment, it can differ from itself whilst still being that same thing. David 
is numerically identical to the two above aspects (and a near-infinite amount other 
aspects), and these aspects are all numerically identical to each other. The same 
individual can possess qualitatively differing aspects that are nevertheless numeri-
cally identical to the individual that bears them and also with each other.
This all seems to be conceptually coherent; however, a pertinent issue appears 
to be in sight—namely, the potential transgression of Leibniz’s Law. Leibniz’s Law 
(the Indiscernibility of Identicals) can be construed formally as such:
(10) (Leibniz’s Law)  ∀x∀y(x = y → (φ(x) ↔ φ(y))
Informally: For any things x and y, if x is numerically identical with y, then for any quality F, 
F is had by x if and only if F is had by y
 At a prima facie level, Leibniz’s Law seems to be transgressed within an aspectival 
framework, as the existence of aspects allows for there to be numerically identical 
entities that do not share the same qualities. Any violation of Leibniz’s Law will 
certainly be problematic for most individuals. However, once this issue is further 
investigated, we can, in fact, see that there is no violation of Leibniz’s Law within 
an aspectival framework as, according to Baxter (2016, 172), aspects allow ‘con-
tradictories to be predicated of the same thing in a way that Leibniz’s Law is silent 
about’. We can begin to notice this ‘silence’ by asking the question of why Leibniz’s 
Law should be taken to apply to all entities, without restriction? Baxter sees that 
the issue might revolve around the frequently raised worry,10 that a relation that is 
not characterised by Leibniz’s Law is not identity.11 However, Baxter (2018a, 908) 
sees that the only reason for this attitude is that the principle seems to express the 
truth that no entity both possesses and lacks a property—that contradictions cannot 
exist in reality. Thus, as Baxter (2018a, 907) writes, ‘It may seem that the origi-
nal Indiscernibility of Identicals [Leibniz’s Law] is just another way of saying that 
nothing both has and lacks a property, which is just another way of saying that no 
9 This identity and conception of the nature of an aspect would also apply to the sub-aspects of an indi-
vidual.
10 As Ted Sider (2007, 58) notes (in a related mereological context), ‘Defenders of strong composition 
as identity must accept this version of Leibniz’s Law; to deny it would arouse suspicion that their use of 
‘is identical to’ does not really express identity’.
11 One might still comment that it is inconceivable to define numerical identity without utilising Leib-
niz’s Law, and thus Baxter’s approach should be rejected. However, Baxter notes that he is not defining 
identity; but instead is taking it as primitive.
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contradictions are true’. It thus seems that individuals regularly accord Leibniz’s 
Law (the Indiscernibility of Identicals) the same unassailable status that is regularly 
given to the Principle of Non-Contradiction. However, following Aristotle, Baxter 
(2018a, 908) sees that what is central to the latter principle is solely that of noth-
ing both possessing and lacking a property in the same respect at the same time. 
Thus, this formulation leaves room to manoeuvre as it opens up the possibility that, 
as Baxter (2018b, 105) writes, ‘something in one respect has a property that it in 
another respect lacks’. However, that claim is not contradictory, as a contradictory 
claim here would be for one to say that some individual in one respect possesses 
a property that in no respect it possesses. Baxter’s non-contradictory claim is thus 
simply that something in one respect is numerically identical with itself in another 
respect.12 Thus, based on this claim, some numerically identical things can quali-
tatively differ without an entailment of a contradiction. Baxter (2018a, 907) thus 
believes that we lack any substantial reason to believe that Leibniz’s Law applies to 
every entity without question, and states that ‘Leibniz’s Law should not be thought 
of as applying absolutely generally to anything that can be talked about; the argu-
ment that it must apply so generally, fails’.
Rather it is important to consider the domain of quantification for Leibniz’s Law. 
That is, according to Baxter, Leibniz’s Law solely applies to individuals (i.e. com-
plete/independent entities) and thus does not generalise over to aspects (i.e. incom-
plete/dependent entities). The non-contradictory internal negation in specific self-
differing claims, such as David’s above, seems to suggest that Leibniz’s Law does 
not apply to aspects. Thus, there are certain cases in which identicals are discern-
ible, yet do not falsify the principle—namely when an individual possesses aspects 
that are numerically identical to it (and each other). The same thing cannot be true 
and false of the same individual, in the same respect, without entailing a contra-
diction (Baxter, 2018a, 908). Yet, phrases such as ‘David insofar as he is a father’ 
refer to aspects, which are incomplete entities, and not the complete individual that 
the aspect is numerically identical with. Thus, as Baxter (2018a, 907) notes, it is 
vital that one is sensitive to ‘aspectival reference’, which refers to aspects and is 
distinguishable from singular reference, which refers to complete entities. Singular 
reference, according to Baxter, is not sensitive to the aspectival distinction, whilst 
the former is. And once we are sensitive to this distinction, we can realise that the 
domain of quantification for Leibniz’s Law, in its original sense, as Baxter (2018b, 
104) writes, ‘includes all the complete entities, but does not include the incomplete 
entities numerically identical to some of them’. Thus, it follows that Leibniz’s Law 
does not preclude the numerically identical aspects of an individual from being 
qualitatively different from each other and the individual themselves.13 Assum-
ing the reality of aspects thus does not lead to a complete denial of Leibniz’s Law. 
13 Baxter (2018a, 909) sees Leibniz’s Law as being closely related to the further principle that co-refer-
ential terms are substitutable salva veritate. However, he notes that this specific principle concerns only 
singular reference, and thus the substitution of expressions only refers to single individuals. One would 
thus need to provide an argument for why it should be generalised to aspects.
12 A single individual differs from itself by having two or more aspects.
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Instead, there is only a denial of an unrestricted understanding of Leibniz’s Law that 
includes all complete and incomplete entities within its domain. More can indeed be 
said here. However, for the task at hand, we can conclude that Leibniz’s Law does 
not apply to aspects, and thus it is coherent to posit the existence of qualitatively dif-
fering, yet numerically identical aspects. We can now turn our attention to the notion 
of essentialism and see how this can be utilised in further precisifying the nature of 
aspects.
The nature of essentialism
Kit Fine (1994a, 1994b, 1995) re-introduced into contemporary metaphysics a ‘non-
modal’ (or, neo-Aristotelian) characterisation of essence. The common approach 
to essence in contemporary metaphysics, prior to the pioneering work of Fine, 
was a ‘modal’ characterisation of essence that conceives of an essence as a modal 
notion—and thus essential truths are a subset of the modal truths.14
Against this latter approach, however, Fine has argued that the modal characteri-
sation account commits one to accept certain predications that say nothing about 
what it is to be the entity in question. Yet, as essentialist predications, according 
to Fine (1994a, 4–5), intuitively should do this, the properties expressed by these 
predications that are in fact irrelevant to the nature of a given entity can in no way be 
essential to it. In short, one cannot thus reduce essence to any modal notion.15 Given 
this, Fine believes that one must instead proceed to detail the nature of essence 
through an alternative, non-modal approach—focused on the further notion of a real 
definition.16 More specifically, non-modal essentialism conceives of an essence as 
14 This modal characterisation is also the one followed by Schmid and Mullins (2021, 2) in the Alone-
ness Argument.
15 The primary method that Fine (1994a, 3–5) followed in showing the failings of the modal charac-
terisation was by adducing certain counterexamples that emphasised the fact that essentialist claims are 
intuitively tied to what an entity is, and thus the modal characterisation of essences fails to provide a 
notion that is, in fact, co-extensional with this intuitive view. The most famous of these counterexamples 
centres on Socrates and the singleton set {Socrates} that contains him. For a detailed unpacking of this 
counterexample and other similar counterexamples, see (Fine, 1994a, 3–5).
16 A question that one can ask—and one that I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for rais-
ing—is that of why one should adopt Fine’s approach when a simpler account of essence is at hand—
specifically, an ‘intrinsicality’ account, which can be stated as follows: a is essentially F iff necessarily 
if a exists then a is intrinsically F (i.e. the essential properties of a thing are the intrinsic properties that 
it cannot fail to have). This account handles Fine’s counterexamples to modal essentialism (e.g. being a 
member of singleton Socrates is not intrinsic to Socrates; singleton Socrates is Socrates ’wearing braces’ 
etc.). However, despite the ability for this account to ward off the issues faced by the modal characterisa-
tion account, one should indeed favour Fine’s account for two reasons: first, the intrinsic/extrinsic prop-
erty divide is notoriously difficult to demarcate—and thus one is utilising an unclear notion (i.e. intrinsi-
cality) to provide clarity to an unclear notion (i.e. essentiality). Second, the former, and not the latter, is 
able to rightly class extrinsic properties (e.g. Socrates’ origination from Sophroniscus and Phaenarete), 
as well as intrinsic properties (e.g. Socrates being human), as essential properties of an entity. In other 
words, the intrinsicality account seems to be unclear (as the notion of the intrinsicality is itself unclear) 
and too strong (as there are indeed essential extrinsic properties) and thus one has good reason to pro-
ceed to utilise Fine’s non-modal account, as it provides a clearer and more flexible approach for clarify-
ing the issue at hand.
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one that functions as the definition of the entity in question. This identification of 
an essence with a definition is expressed by Fine (1994a, 3) when he writes, ‘my 
overall position is the reverse of the usual one. It sees real definition rather than 
de re modality as central to our understanding of the concept’. And thus, as he fur-
ther writes, ‘just as we may define a word, or say what it means, so we may define 
an object, or say what it is’ (Fine, 1994a, 2). Essence is thus taken by Fine to be 
ontologically equivalent to a linguistic definition. That is, in a similar manner to a 
linguistic definition—which states what a certain term means—an essence acts as a 
real definition of an entity—it reveals and explains the essence of an entity (without 
being a distinct entity from that essence). In short, it states what that object is. Real 
definitions thus act in a manner as explanatory principles, in that they tell us, in the 
most perspicuous manner, what the entity is, as Fine (1994a, 3) expresses this in 
writing that.
[T]he traditional assimilation of essence to definition is better suited to the task 
of explaining what essence is. It may not provide us with an analysis of the 
concept, but it does provide us with a good model of how the concept works.
Consequently, Fine sees a definitional characterisation of essence as the one that 
is needed for this task, as the essence of an entity is those propositions that are part 
of the entity’s ‘definition’ and thus this approach, unlike the modal approach, ena-
bles only relevant propositions to be included within the essence of an individual 
(Fine, 1995). Taking these things into account, we can construe the notion of an 
essence, identified as the real definition of an entity, more precisely as follows:
(11) (Essence)  The essence (or real definition) of x is the collection of all propositions that are true in 
virtue of the nature of x
Importantly, Fine (1994b, 54–55) sees that the ‘true in virtue of the nature of’ locu-
tion signifies an unanalysed relation between a proposition and an entity—where a 
proposition bears this relation to an entity when that proposition is true because of 
the entity having the nature that it does. A nature within the non-modal essential-
ist framework under question is the collection of the properties that are possessed 
essentially by that entity—they are properties that make the entity be the entity that 
it is. Given this construal of an essence, we can re-construe the essential/accidental 
distinction as follows: first, for essential properties, we can conceive of them for-
mally as follows (with E standing for ‘essential property’ and M standing for ‘mak-
ing an entity what it is’):
(12) (Essential)  E(F, x) → M(F, x)
Informally If F is an essential property of x, then F is a property that makes x what it is.
Second, for accidental properties, we can conceive of them formally as such:
(13) (Accidental)  ~ E(F, x) →  ~ M(F, x)
Informally: If F is an accidental property of x, then F is a property that does not make x what it is
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 So, in utilising the distinctions that are available within this non-modal essentialist 
framework, we can again focus on David from our previous section, who is a human 
person that fulfils the role of being a philosopher and father (amongst other things). 
We can state these distinctions in David’s case as such: (Table 1).
David has an essence: a human essence, which is identified as a real definition that 
expresses what he is—namely, that of him being a human. More specifically, the essence 
(or real definition) of David is the collection of propositions that are true in virtue of the 
human nature of David. The human nature that is had by David would itself be a collec-
tion that is made of the properties that are possessed essentially by David—in that they 
are properties that make David be the entity that he is: human. And thus, in assuming an 
Aristotelian view of humanity, we can take these essential properties to be such things 
as rational animality, moral awareness and freedom of the will. David is essentially a 
human; however, he is also a philosopher and a father, and thus has the properties of 
being a philosopher and being a father. However, as these latter properties do not make 
David what he is—they do not make him human—they are accidental properties of 
David, and thus can be lacked by him, without him ceasing to be what he is.
For heuristic purposes, we can illustrate the various distinctions made within the 
non-modal essentialist framework in this specific example as follows (with ‘Philoso-
phy’ standing for ‘David’s role as a philosopher’, ‘Father’ standing for ‘David’s role 
as a Father’, ‘Rationality’ standing for ‘rational animality’, ‘Moral A’ standing for 
‘moral awareness’, ‘Freedom’ standing for ‘freedom of choice’, ‘TIVO’ standing for 
‘true in virtue of’, ‘PMUB’ standing for ‘partly made up by’) (Fig. 1):
In this illustration, we see the essential properties of David being connected to 
his nature and thus his essence. In contrast, the accidental properties of David do not 
have a connection to his nature and thus his essence. In other words, it is the essen-
tial properties of David, and not his accidental properties, that play a role in defining 
him as he is—through making up David’s nature, which his essence (or real defini-
tion) is true in virtue of. Taking this all into account, from our unpacking of the non-
modal conception of essence provided by Fine, and the notion of an aspect provided 
by Baxter in the previous section, we can now finally bring these notions together, 
which will help us to deal with the Aloneness Argument.
Aspectival simplicity: an essentialist extension
God is construed within the Aspectival Account as an entity that is numerically 
identical to an omnipotence module trope (hereafter, omnipotence-trope or sim-
ply Omnipotence). A module trope is an abstract particular nature of a modular 
kind.17 In briefly unpacking this within a theistic context, God is, first, abstract 
in the sense of him having the trait of being ‘less than the including whole’—in a 
17 The following is a very brief statement of the nature of a module trope, as elucidated within a theistic 
context. For a further explanation of the nature of module trope (and that of a modifier trope) and a fur-
ther explanation for why God must indeed be conceptualised as this type of entity, see (Sijuwade, 2021).
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Christian theistic context, God does not exhaust his ‘content’ or ‘plime’ (or is less 
than his ‘content’ or ‘plime’)—identified as the Trinity—as his content or plime 
also includes the possibility of other tropes being collocated with him (i.e. the Son 
and the Spirit), which results in him not exhausting either of these things—in short, 
wherever God is located there are other tropes that are located there with him. Sec-
ond, God is particular by him failing to abide by Leibniz’s Law (the Identity of 
Indiscernibles)—as again within a Christian theistic context—there is the possibility 
of the existence of entities—duplicates, identified as the Son and the Spirit—that are 
exactly similar in their intrinsic properties (i.e. their nature) to him, yet are numeri-
cally distinct from him.18 Third, God is identical to his qualitative nature—he is the 
specific character that he has, which is that of him being omnipotent. God’s nature is 
thus intrinsic to him, not in the sense of him possessing a further intrinsic ‘property’, 
but simply that of him being numerically identical to this nature. Fourth, God is a 
trope of a modular kind, which is that of him being a maximally-thinly charactered 
object—a property in an analogous sense (i.e. a property*)—that is self-exempli-
fying and—in assuming Christian Theism again—serves the role of bestowing this 
characteristic upon the Trinity which he constitutes. Moreover, since God is a trope 
of a modular kind, he plays a direct role in causation and is thus a basic term of a 
causal relation. Thus, as God is numerically identical to an omnipotence-trope, he 
is a module trope that has the ability to perform any logically possible action. God 
is thus an omnipotence-trope. However, instead of this omnipotence-trope entail-
ing the possession of the further properties of omniscience, omnipresence, perfect 
Fig. 1  Essentialist framework (human example)
18 Leibniz’s Law was previously conceived of here as the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. 
However, now we are conceiving of it in this case as its converse—the principle of the identity of indis-
cernibles, which can be stated formally as such: ∀φ(φ(x) ↔ φ(y) → x = y).
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freedom and perfect goodness (as is regularly taken to be so),19 we can now ‘con-
vert’ these properties into aspects, which will also result in the entailment relation 
being converted into a relation of numerical identity. So, in mapping out this conver-
sion process, we can illustrate this as such (Fig. 2):
Given these conversions, we can now further understand the nature of these 
‘aspects of omnipotence’ by focusing on their functional role and the relationship 
that they have to the omnipotence-trope, which allows us to say that they are not 
properties, complete entities, or mereological parts. Rather, they are incomplete 
abstract particular entities that are numerically identical to a specific complete indi-
vidual and function as his ways of being. More fully, each of the aspects of omnipo-
tence is numerically identical to the omnipotence-trope, yet they do not possess the 
same characteristics as it—they are not the ability to perform any logically possible 
action. Lacking this characteristic, the aspects of omnipotence are thus incomplete 
entities, in that they are dependent on the omnipotence-trope, which exists as a com-
plete entity (i.e. an independently existing entity). These aspects of omnipotence do 
not exhaust the content or plime that they are aspects of (i.e. they each do not exhaust 
the omnipotence-trope), and they each function as ways that the omnipotence-trope 
exists, which we can consider through a process of abstraction. This aspectival con-
strual of the divine properties thus allows us to re-define the traditional set of divine 
properties in Table 2 as such20:
At a specific level, these aspects of omnipotence are focused on the different par-
ticular ways in which the omnipotence-trope is. That is, by this module trope having 
(or, more specifically, being) the singular-character of omnipotence, it would exist 
in a particular manner and have certain limitless abilities that enable it to fulfil dif-
ferent roles. This functional role fulfilled by the omnipotence-trope allows one to 
establish an aspectival distinction that takes these ways to be aspects of this specific 
trope. Therefore, as was seen with our previous example, we have a case of self-dif-
fering here. The subjects of this differing would be the aspects of the omnipotence-
trope, with each aspect possessing a ‘quality’ that each of the other aspects lacks.21 
For instance, focusing on the Omniscient-Aspect and the Freedom-Aspect, we have 
the following examples:
(14) Omnipotencey[y is knowledge] enables its bearer to know whether it snowed in New York on Janu-
ary 1st 2 A.D
(15)  ~  Omnipotencey[y is freedom] enables its bearer to know whether it snowed in New York on Janu-
ary 1st 2 A.D
19 For a detailed explanation of why there is this entailment of the other divine properties from omnip-
otence, see (Swinburne, 2016, 174–75). Furthermore, the construal of omnipotence above is a basic 
construal provided by (Swinburne, 2010, 8), which is subject to certain counterexamples (such as the 
‘McEar’ objection). For these counterexamples and a more refined definition of omnipotence that does 
not face these counterexamples, see (Swinburne, 2016, 150–74).
20 The traditional set of divine properties would include more than what is included here. However, for 
brevity’s sake, we will focus on these specific five properties. Furthermore, this specific set of properties 
and their definitions are derived from the work (Swinburne, 2016).
21 The qualities would be ‘sub-aspects’ of the aspects under question—more on the nature of sub-aspects 
within a theistic context below.
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And, for the Omnipresent-Aspect and the Goodness-Aspect, we also have the fol-
lowing examples:
(16) Omnipotencey[y is presence] enables its bearer to be cognizant of, and causally active at, the 
Galactic Center
(17)  ~  Omnipotencey[y is goodness] enables its bearer to be cognizant of, and causally active at, the 
Galactic Center
 In these examples, we do not have a case of internal conflict, as in the example of 
David above; however, it is a case of differing, by there being a qualitative difference 
between the aspects of the omnipotence-trope. And, importantly, it is a case of self-
differing, as the aspects are numerically identical to the omnipotence-trope itself. 
This is certainly the case, as from the position that was reached at the beginning of 
this section of God being numerically identical to the omnipotence-trope:
(18) God = Omnipotence
we can now, within this aspectival framework, proceed to posit a numerical iden-
tity between the omnipotence-trope and the various aspects of omnipotence:
(19) Omnipotence =  Omnipotencey [y is knowledge];  Omnipotencey [y is presence];  Omnipotencey [y is 
freedom];  Omnipotencey [y is goodness]
Omnipotence insofar as it is a certain way (e.g. an omniscient way, an omnipres-
ent way etc.) is still Omnipotence, which is still, at the bottom level, God. Yet, due 
to the formal characteristics of the numerical identity relation—namely, the transi-
tivity of identity—each of the aspects of omnipotence is also numerically identical 
to each of the other aspects:
(20) Omnipotencey [y is knowledge] =  Omnipotencey [y is presence],
(21) Omnipotencey [y is presence] =  Omnipotencey [y is freedom],
(22) Omnipotencey [y is freedom] =  Omnipotencey [y is goodness]
Within an aspectival context, the same thing: the omnipotence-trope, which is 
numerically identical to God, is discerned in multiple ways without absurdity. More 
specifically, within this aspectival framework, there is one property*, the omnip-
otence-trope, that is identical to multiple aspects, which are, in turn, identical to 
one another. In short, God is the omnipotence-trope, the omnipotence-trope is the 
qualitatively differing aspects of omnipotence, and the qualitatively differing aspects 
of omnipotence are one another. The traditional understanding of the possession of 
‘many qualities’ by God is thus, in fact, the possession of many qualitatively dif-
fering, yet numerically identical aspects. The aspects of omnipotence provide a 
certain ‘complexity to the simple’—a qualitative complexity to the quantitatively 
simple omnipotence-trope which God is. Thus, by utilising an aspectival distinction 
here, in a ‘loose’ sense, focused on qualitative distinctiveness, we can indeed count 
a multiplicity of aspects within God. Yet, in a strict sense, focused on numerical 
1 3
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distinctiveness, there is solely one self-same property*, the omnipotence-trope, 
which is differently considered. We can now illustrate the position reached here as 
such (with the double-headed arrows representing an identity relation) (Fig. 3):
Turning our attention now onto non-modal essentialism, an essence, as previ-
ously noted, focuses on stating what it is to be a certain thing through the notion 
of a real definition—a collection of all the propositions that are true in virtue of 
the nature of an entity. In the aspectival framework developed here, we retain this 
conception of essence. However, by us converting God’s properties to aspects, we 
now take the nature of God to be construed as the collection of the aspects that are 
possessed essentially by God—they are the aspects that make God the entity that he 
is. This allows us to now conceive of the essential/accidental distinction as follows: 
first, for essential aspects, we can construe them formally as follows (with E stand-
ing for ‘essential aspect’ and M standing for ‘making an entity what it is’):
(23) (Essential*)  E(F, x) → M(F, x)
Informally: If F is an essential aspect of x, then F is an aspect that makes x what it is
Second, for accidental aspects we can construe them formally as such:
(24) (Accidental*) ~ E(F, x) →  ~ M(F, x)
Informally: If F is an accidental aspect of x, then F is an aspect that does not make x what it is
So, within a theistic context, we can apply these various distinctions to the case 
of God in Table 3 as follows: 
God, as with other entities, has an essence: a divine essence, which is identified 
as a real definition that expresses what he is—namely, that of him being divine. The 
essence (or real definition) of God is the collection of propositions that are true in 
virtue of the divine nature of God. The divine nature that is ‘had’ by God would 
itself be a collection that is made up of the aspects that are borne essentially by 
God—in that they are qualitatively differing, yet numerically identical, aspects that 
make God be the entity that he is: divine. And thus, taking into account the aspects 
of omnipotence introduced previously, these would be the Omniscience-Aspect, 
Omnipresence-Aspect, Perfect Freedom-Aspect and the Perfect-Goodness-Aspect. 
God would thus bear a number of essential aspects that he must have in order to be 
God. For example, focusing on the relationship between the Omniscience-Aspect 
and the characteristic of being omnipotent, for God to be an omnipotence-trope—
that is him having the ability to perform any logically possible action—then he 
must, at the minimum, possess knowledge of what occurred in the past (and what is 
occurring now in the present) in order for him to know of (and believe no false prop-
ositions about) what actions are logically possible for him to perform at any given 
Fig. 2  Aspectival and relation conversions
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point in time. Thus, to be what God is—namely, an omnipotence-trope—God must 
also have the ability to know the truth of all propositions (and believing no false 
proposition)—in short, God must bear an Omniscience-Aspect, with this require-
ment holding for all of the other aspects of omnipotence noted above as well. Impor-
tantly, however, in the ‘exercising’ of these aspects, God would also have a number 
of accidental aspects, three of which will be the following:
(25) (Accidental Aspects) (a) Creator-Aspect:  Omnipotencey[y is creator] (i.e. Omnipotence insofar as 
it is the performance of the action of creating the universe (i.e. Creator))
(b) Moral Lawgiver-Aspect:  Goodnessy[y is moral] (i.e. Omnipotence 
insofar as it the ability to perform the best action/kind of action, many 
good actions and no bad actions insofar as it is performance of the action 
of revealing the moral law (i.e. Moral Law Giver))
(c) Particular Knowledge-Aspect:  Omnisciencey[y is p-knowledge] (i.e. 
Omnipotence insofar as it the ability to know of all true proposition and 
believe no false propositions insofar as it is the knowing of the truth value 
of a certain proposition (i.e. Particular Knowledge))
For (Accidental Aspects), God bears certain aspects that qualitatively dif-
fer, yet are numerically identical to him (and all of his other aspects). However, as 
these aspects do not make God what he is—they do not make him divine—they 
are accidental aspects of God and thus can be lacked by him—without him ceas-
ing to be what he is. For heuristic purposes, we can illustrate the various distinc-
tions made within the essentialist aspectival framework in this specific context as 
follows (with all the relations remaining as before and now ‘Creator’ standing for 
‘Creator-Aspect’, ‘Omniscience’ standing for ‘Omniscience-Aspect’, ‘Omnipres-
ence’ standing for ‘Omnipresence-Aspect’, ‘P-Knowledge’ standing for ‘Particular 
Knowledge-Aspect’, ‘Freedom’ standing for ‘Freedom-Aspect’, ‘Goodness’ standing 
for ‘Goodness-Aspect’, ‘Moral LG’ standing for ‘Moral Lawgiver-Aspect’) (Fig. 4):
Fig. 3  Aspectival simplicity
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As in the more mundane case of David above, in this illustration, we see that the 
essential aspects of God are connected to his nature and thus his essence. In con-
trast, the accidental aspects of God do not have a connection to his nature and thus 
his essence. In other words, it is the essential aspects of God, and not his accidental 
aspects, that play a role in defining him as he is—through making up God’s nature, 
which his essence (or real definition) is true in virtue of. However, in this specific 
theistic case, unlike in the more mundane case, we have multiple essential aspects 
and accidental aspects being borne by God, rather than any essential or accidental 
properties being exemplified by him—which thus retains God’s simplicity (i.e. his 
lack of metaphysical complexity).
Now, focusing again on the accidental aspects of omnipotence, for (a), we have an 
’aspect’, and for (b)–(c) we have two ‘sub-aspects’—which, as noted previously, are 
aspects of aspects. More precisely, and taking these individually, with (a) we have a state-
ment concerning a particular way in which the omnipotence-trope is exercised—specifi-
cally, it is the particular action performed by the omnipotence-trope in creating the uni-
verse. Whereas, in the case of (b), what we have is that of the omnipotence-trope fulfilling 
the role had by the Goodness-Aspect by performing the best action/kind of action of pro-
viding a certain moral law (e.g. the Ten Commandments) to a specific people group—
the latter is thus a sub-aspect of the Goodness-Aspect. And in the case of (c), what we 
have is that of the omnipotence-trope fulfilling the role had by the Omniscience-Aspect 
of knowing the truth value of a certain proposition—the latter is thus a sub-aspect of the 
Omniscience-Aspect. In each of these cases—aspect and sub-aspect—we have the posit-
ing of accidents in the divine life. Which provides the grounds for dealing with (A10) of 
Fig. 4  Essentialist framework (theism)
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the Aloneness Argument as follows: this specific premise takes it to be the case that God 
cannot have any accidents—as supposedly the DDS requires God to lack accidents, due 
to the fact that God’s identity to an accident would render him as contingent. However, 
against this, the Aspectival Account allows one to affirm the identity between God and 
his attributes—construed as aspects—whilst allowing them to bear differing qualities to 
him. Thus God can have accidents (i.e. accidental aspects) without falling into absurd-
ity. That is, as these accidents are aspects—rather than properties—they can qualitatively 
differ from the omnipotence-trope (and one another) by bearing further ‘qualities’ (i.e. 
‘qualitied’ sub-aspects) that the omnipotence-trope (and each of the other aspects) does 
not have. So, in the case under question, we have the following being true22:
(26) Omnipotence (unqualified) is necessary
(27)  ~  Omnisciencey[y is p-knowledge] is necessary
The primary reason in support of the truth of (26) and (27) is two-fold: first, as Leib-
niz’s Law is silent in regards to aspects (as this law solely applies to complete individuals 
and thus does not generalise over to the (essential and accidental) aspects of omnipotence, 
which exist as incomplete/dependent entities), if  Omnisciencey[y is p-knowledge] is contin-
gent—through the proposition that is known by God being a contingent truth—there is no 
requirement that Omnipotence (unqualified) must also be contingent in order for both of 
these entities to be numerically identical. Rather, the silence of Leibniz’s Law allows the 
former to have this quality, which is, in turn, lacked by the latter. Second, in building on 
the first point, we can thus hold to (Block) being true within an aspectival context, as it 
doesn’t follow from the fact that an aspect of an individual has a certain quality that the 
individual that bears that aspect also has that quality—as in our previous example,  Davidy[y 
is a philosopher] does not want to go on a camping trip does not entail ‘David does not 
want to go on a camping trip’. Similarly, in the theistic case under question,  Omnisciencey[y 
is p-knowledge] has the quality of being contingent—as it can be lacked by God, without 
causing him to cease to be God. However, ‘Omnipotence (unqualified)’ does not have the 
quality of being contingent, as it has the quality of being necessary—as God must exist in 
order to be God. So, the statements ‘Omnipotence (unqualified) is not contingent (i.e. is nec-
essary)’ and ‘Omnisciencey[y is p-knowledge] is contingent’ are what is true, which shows 
that aspects of God (i.e. Omnipotence) can have qualities which God unqualified does not 
have. Therefore, what have within this aspectival framework is that of God being able to 
have an intrinsic accident—based on divine freedom, the contingency of creation and divine 
omniscience in the alone world (and other worlds)—whilst still being identical to this acci-
dent, without; however, this identity rendering God as a contingent entity—due to the fact 
that God bears multiple essential and accidental aspects that are qualitatively different, yet 
numerically identical to him (and each other). One of these (sub)aspects—which has been 
termed  Omnisciencey[y is p-knowledge]—focuses on God’s contingent knowledge about 
the truth value of a certain proposition—specifically, that of him possessing knowledge 
22 The ‘quality’ of necessity in (26) would be an aspect of omnipotence: Necessity-Aspect (i.e. 
 Omnipotencey[y is necessary]), and the ‘quality’ of contingency in (27) would be a sub-aspect of the 
P-Knowledge-Aspect (i.e. P-Knowledgey[y is contingent]).
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concerning the contingency of creation (i.e. him having created a non-God world or not) and 
his aloneness or accompaniment (i.e. him being alone or with other non-God things, based 
upon his creative action) in each of the worlds in which he exists. This aspect is identical to 
God and contingent, yet as this entity is an incomplete entity, and thus Leibniz Law does not 
include it within its domain, this quality of contingency does not render God as contingent 
himself. Rather it is this aspect, which is a positive (intrinsic) ontological feature of God, and 
not God (unqualified) who has this quality, with the latter simply remaining as a necessary 
being. Thus, contra (A10), if the DDS is true—as formulated by the Aspectival Account—
God can have accidents (which are intrinsic features of him), whilst remaining simple and 
necessary, and thus the Accidents Assumption and (most importantly) the Aloneness Argu-
ment that rests upon this assumption, is indeed false.23
Yet, we do not need to end on a negative note, as in the case of the defeat of the 
Aloneness Argument within an aspectival framework, a Classical Theist is provided 
with good reason to modify the classical conception of the DDS found in (1) in such 
a way as to not negate things of God which he, in fact, can indeed possess. This pro-
posed revision, though minor, is indeed important and can be construed as follows:
(28) (Divine Simplicity *) There is no metaphysical or physical composition in God, such that:
(i) There is no distinction in God between substance/attribute properties, 
essence/existence, form/matter, act/potency, genus/ differentia, agent/
action, and essence/accidental properties
(ii) All of God’s intrinsic features are identical not only to each other but to 
God Himself
As before, the DDS negates all metaphysical complexity within God; however, 
unlike before, this negation, in respect to accidents, would solely be that of acci-
dental properties, which allows God to indeed possess accidents that are ‘property-
like’—namely, accidental aspects, that are nevertheless not numerically distinct 
intrinsic features. God can thus have accidents, yet remain simple and necessary, in 
an alone world or a world with other, non-God things.
23 Interestingly, the conclusion reached here also allows one to deal with the (infamous) modal collapse 
argument, stated most recently by Mullins (2021, 94–95) as such:
 M1 If God intentionally acts to actualize this world, then this world cannot possibly fail to obtain.
 M2 If God’s intentional act to actualize this world is absolutely necessary, then this world exists of 
absolute necessity.
 M3 God’s existence is absolutely necessary.
 M4 Anything that is identical to God’s existence must be absolutely necessary.
 M5 All of God’s intentional actions are identical to each other such that there is only one divine act.
 M6 God’s one divine act is identical to God’s existence.
 M7 God’s one divine act is absolutely necessary. (M3–M6).
 M8 God’s intentional act to actualize this world is absolutely necessary. (M7).
 M9 This world exists of absolute necessity. (M2, M8).
 This argument can be avoided within the framework and account that has been proposed here, as (M4) 
is indeed false, given that God’s creative act—construed in the Aspectival Account as the Creator-
Aspect—is identical to God, yet it can qualitatively differ from him, and thus God (unqualified) can be 
necessary whilst this aspect (i.e. his creative act) and the world both remain contingent.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, the issue presented to the Classical Theist by the Aloneness Argu-
ment—namely, the falsity of the DDS—has been shown to be a non-issue, given 
that one of the key premises of the argument—which expresses the ‘Accidents 
Assumption’—is itself false once the DDS is explicated within an essentialist aspec-
tival framework. The DDS, as construed through the Aspectival Account, allows a 
Classical Theist to conceive of God as having accidents, without, however, them 
falling into absurdity and facing the dilemma presented by the Aloneness Argument. 
The God of Classical Theism can indeed bear accidents (i.e. accidental aspects) and 
yet still be simple and a necessary entity in every alone or accompanied world.24
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